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Equal Protection and Classifications
Based on Family Membership
Samuel A. Alito*
I. Introduction
During the past eight years the United States Supreme Court
has decided more than a dozen cases in which statutory classifications
based on membership in the traditional family were challenged
under the equal protection clause.' The test used by the Court in
judging the constitutional validity of these classifications is not read-
ily apparent. In Levy v. Louisiana2 a wrongful death statute that
did not provide for recovery by illegitimate children on the death
of their mother was struck down. The Court seemed to employ a
nascent strict scrutiny test and several commentators predicted that
illegitimacy would be added to the list of suspect classifications.'
Three years later in Labine v. Vincent,4 however, the Court upheld
Louisiana's scheme of intestate succession giving legitimate children
rights superior to those of illegitimate children who had been "ac-
knowledged" by their father under state law. Writing for the major-
ity, Justice Black pointedly stated that illegitimacy was not a suspect
* A.B. 1972, Princeton University; J.D. 1975, Yale University. Law Clerk
to Hon. Leonard I. Garth, United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, 1976-1977.
Member of the New Jersey Bar.
1. See Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973);
New Jersey Welfare Rts. Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Gomez v. Perez, 409
U.S. 535 (1973); Richardson v. Griffin, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972); Richardson v. Davis,
409 U.S. 1069 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Stan-
ley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971); Dan-
dridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co.,
391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). Dandridge and Jimenez
are not discussed, since they do not concern distinctions between traditional and non-
traditional families. Dandridge involved discrimination between families on the basis
of size and Jimenez concerned discrimination between different classes of illegitimate
children.
2. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
3. E.g., Gray & Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate, 118 U.
PA. L. REv. 1 (1969); Note, Development in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HArv. L.
REV. 68, 1127 (1969).
4. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
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classification 5 and proceeded to apply such a permissive equal protec-
tion test that Justice Brennan, in dissent, concluded that the Court
had excluded illegitimate children from the protection of the equal
protection clause altogether.6 Not surprisingly, numerous commen-
tators felt that Labine represented a marked departure from Levy
and that the shift was attributable to intervening changes in the
Court's membership.7
The pendulum swung back in 1972 in Weber v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co. 8  In this case the Court found that a workmen's com-
pensation statute giving legitimate children rights superior to illegit-
imate children violated equal protection. Justice Powell employed
a test that sought to bridge the "old" and "new" equal protection.'
He wrote that the "essential inquiry" in all equal protection cases
"[was] inevitably a dual one: What legitimate state interest does
the classification promote? What fundamental personal rights might
the classification endanger?"' 0  Like Labine, Weber was viewed by
some commentators as a major shift in the Court's position.11
In four cases decided in 1972 and 1973 the Court held, virtually
without explanation, that various statutes discriminating against ille-
gitimate children or biological families violated the equal protection
clause. 2 Justice Stewart added to the confusion by observing, in
his concurring opinion in San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez, that classifications based on illegitimacy are suspect "at
least in some settings."' 3
5. Id. at 536.
6. Id. at 541. Justice Black's only reference to any equal protection
standard-minimal scrutiny---occurred in a footnote. .d. at 536 n.6. Justice Bren-
nan intimated that he and the three Justices who joined in his dissent felt that
illegitimacy was a suspect classification. Id. at 551 n.19.
7. E.g., 34 U. Prrr. L. REV. 472 (1973); 49 TEX. L. REV. 1132, 1138 (1971).
See also G. GUNTHER & N. DOWLINO, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 212, 220 (Supp. 1974).
8. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
9. Professor Gerald Gunther classified Powell's test as an example of the
"newer" equal protection. Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HA.v. L. REV. 1, 31
(1972).
10. 406 U.S. at 173.
11. E.g., Winter, The Changing Parameters of Substantive Equal Protection, 23
EMORY L.J. 657 (1974); 34 U. PrrT. L. REV. 472 (1973).
12. New Jersey Welfare Rts. Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Gomez v.
Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Richardson v. Davis, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972); Richardson
v. Griffin, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972).
13. 411 U.S. 1, 61 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
In addition to challenges of statutes discriminating against
illegitimates, equal protection attacks were made on legislation
that distinguished between traditional families and groups of unre-
lated persons that performed many of the same emotional and eco-
nomic functions ("associational" families). The Supreme Court
heard this argument in 1972 when a statute prohibiting dis-
tribution of food stamps to households containing two or more
unrelated persons was challenged. 1 4  Although the Court held
that the statute violated the equal protection clause, the majority did
not address the associational family argument. Nevertheless, several
commentators interpreted the case to mean that "governmental im-
position of private social preferences is an impermissible legislative
objective."'15 Two years later in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,'6
the Court was again urged to hold that discrimination against associa-
tional families was unconstitutional. This case involved the constitu-
tionality of a zoning ordinance that permitted traditional families of
any size, but excluded households composed of three or more unre-
lated persons. In a puzzling opinion by Justice Douglas, the Court
upheld the ordinance, making only scant reference to its effect on
associational families. Boraas suggested that certain laws distin-
guishing between traditional and associational families are permis-
sible, but the decision was too firmly grounded in the context of zon-
ing to permit confident generalization.
While some commentators viewed these family membership
cases as potentially revolutionary, most simply regarded them as per-
plexing. With each new case the Court appeared to employ a dif-
ferent equal protection standard without explaining why it chose to
apply the test it did. As a result, the status under the equal protec-
tion clause of laws that assign special rights, benefits, and duties to
traditional families and their members remains doubtful. Even an-
ticipating the test that the Court will apply if these laws are chal-
lenged is problematic.
This article attempts to reconcile the family membership cases
and identify the underlying considerations that determined their out-
come. In doing so, this article will show that the Court has pursued
a consistent, although not explicitly stated, approach to the problem
of classifications based on family membership.
II. All Equal Protection Tests Seek To Balance Interests
Commentators have identified three different equal protection
tests used by the Supreme Court in recent years: the minimal scru-
14. Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
15. 48 TuL. L. REV. 412, 417 (1974). See also Noonan, The Family and the
Supreme Court, 23 CATH. L. REv. 255, 262-63 (1973).
16. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
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tiny test, the strict scrutiny test, and an intermediate test associated
with the "newer" equal protection. The multiplicity of tests and the
seemingly arbitrary manner in which they were selected pose an ob-
stacle to understanding these cases. Fortunately, recent articles 7
and judicial opinions' suggest an interpretation that surmounts this
obstacle. These articles and opinions contend that all equal protec-
tion tests actually amount to methods of balancing the individual in-
terests impaired by the challenged legislation against the govern-
mental interests that are furthered.
A. Minimal Scrutiny
The minimal scrutiny test requires that the challenged statutory
classification be rationally related to the statute's purpose.' 9 As the
Court stated in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,'0 under this
test a challenged statute does not violate the equal protection clause
"if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain
it."21 This formulation means that the statutory classification must
be assigned any purpose that it could reasonably have and that a
court must find a rational relationship between the purpose and the
classification if any set of facts reasonably could be conceived to
evince such a relationship.
This test is meaningless.' 2 It does not specify how a court is
to determine the purpose of a challenged law. A court, for example,
could study the legislative history of the law in an attempt to dis-
cover what motivated its enactment. Alternatively, it could examine
the act that contained the challenged provision and ascertain its gen-
eral purposes. The purpose discovered by either method would not
always be rationally related to the challenged provision. There is,
however, a third method that will always reveal a purpose ra-
tionally related to the challenged provision. This method finds the
17. Comment, Fundamental Personal Rights, 40 U. Cm. L REv. 807 (1973);
Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123
(1972).
18. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458 (1973) (White, J., concurring); San
Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 79 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing); Chicago Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (Marshall, J.); Weber v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (Powell, J.).
19. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308 (1966).
20. 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
21. Id. at 79.
22. See Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE
L.J. 123 (1972).
purpose of the challenged provision in its own terms; the provi-
sion's purpose is to do precisely what it does. Since it is always rea-
sonable to assign this tautological purpose to a challenged statute,
the minimal scrutiny test requires that it be assigned if none of the
purposes discovered by other means are rationally related to the stat-
ute. Since this tautological purpose is always rationally related
to the challenged classification, scrupulous application of the minimal
scrutiny test can never strike down a statute. In practice, however,
the Court has used the minimal scrutiny test to strike down laws by
refusing to recognize the tautological purpose.
While the analysis required by the minimal scrutiny test is
meaningless, it is easy to understand the considerations that have de-
termined the results in cases employing this test. Like all equal pro-
tection tests, it balances the individual interests impaired by the chal-
lenged provision against the governmental interests that the provi-
sion furthers. The minimal scrutiny test, however, strongly favors
the government's interest in pursuing whatever course of action it
deems best. Sometimes the government's interest was virtually in-
superable, for instance, as in the post-1937 economic legislation;23




The strict scrutiny test, prominent during the heyday of the
"new," two-tiered equal protection in the late 1960's, was invoked
when the challenged classification was "suspect"2 5 and when the in-
dividual interest impaired was "fundamental. ' 26  Although the
Court dropped hints, it never explained what made a classification
suspect or an interest fundamental; instead it simply proclaimed
that they were such.
23. It was overcome only once, in Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957). One
of the most extreme examples of judicial deference in this area and, interestingly, a
case involving a classification based in part on family membership was Kotch v.
Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947), in which Louisiana's
administrative exclusion from the river port pilot profession of all but relatives and
friends of current pilots was held constitutional. The Court reasoned that this might
have increased "congeniality" among the pilots and, thus, was rationally related to the
goal of securing a very safe system of pilotage.
24. See, e.g., Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550 (1935); F.S.
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
25. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Mc-
Laughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (race); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633
(1948) (ancestry). For a discussion of the apparent characteristics of these classifi-
cations see Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1245-
58 (1974); Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV.
1068, 1124-27 (1969).
26. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (voting); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate travel); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23





The test had two requirements: the purpose of the challenged
classification had to be related to a "compelling" state interest l and
the classification had to be tailored carefully to serve the state's com-
pelling interest precisely. To satisfy the latter requirement, the
challenged law had to promote the compelling state interest 2s and
impair the fundamental personal interests involved only to the extent
necessary to serve the compelling state interest.29
Unlike the minimal scrutiny test, this test explicitly balanced in-
terests. The classic balancing metaphor of a scale aptly describes
the test: if a weight representing the individual rights impaired in
a strict scrutiny case were placed in one pan of the scale, only a more
heavily weighted governmental interest, one that is compelling and
significantly advanced by the challenged legislation, could counter-
balance it and save the statute.
C. The "Newer" Equal Protection
The "newer" equal protection is a term used by Professor Gun-
ther to describe the Court's efforts in recent years to develop an
intermediate equal protection test.3" During the 1971 term, and to
some extent thereafter, the Court employed the usually toothless
minimal scrutiny test to strike down challenged statutes. This led
Professor Gunther to suggest that the Court was developing an inter-
mediate, "means-oriented" test.
[The "newer" equal protection] would mean that the Court
would be less willing to supply justifying rationales by exercising
its imagination. It would have the Court assess the means in
terms of legislative purposes that have substantial basis in actual-
ity, not merely in conjecture. Moreover, it would have the
Justices gauge the reasonableness of questionable means on the
basis of materials that are offered to the Court, rather than re-
sorting to rationalizations created by perfunctory judicial hypoth-
esizing. 3 '
27. See, e.g., Shapiro vi. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969). Some commen-
tators on the equal protection clause argue that the compelling interest test applies
only to cases involving fundamental interests. Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect
Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1251-52 (1974). But they are forced to admit
that even members of the Court are "confused" on this point. Id. at 1252.
28. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
29. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
30. Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 31 (1972).
31. Id.
This test would put "new bite into the old equal protection" by per-
mitting the Court to disregard the tautological purposes of chal-
lenged statutes, which under the minimal scrutiny test upheld
virtually every statute. Gunther's model recommends that the Court
vengefully employ all the old techniques to find violations under the
meaningless minimal scrutiny test." The underlying considerations,
therefore, would be similar to those that figure in all minimal scru-
tiny cases.
III. The Balance Struck from Levy to Boraas
Once it is recognized that all equal protection analyses bal-
ance the interests of the individual and the state, the best way
to understand the family membership cases is to examine how
the Court weighed the interests involved.33  The outcome in those
cases was determined by the relative weight assigned to three inter-
ests: the interest of illegitimate children in not being disad-
vantaged because of their parents' behavior; the individual's interest
in choosing to belong to a biological or associational family rather
than a traditional one; and the state's interest in aiding the traditional
family or in encouraging people to form traditional rather than bio-
logical or associational families.
As mentioned previously, two classifications have been vigor-
ously attacked-those excluding illegitimate children and those ex-
cluding biological or associational families. A chronological review
of the cases in each category will reveal the balance that has been
struck by the Court.
A. Classifications Excluding Illegitimate Children
1. Levy v. Louisiana.34 -This case concerned the constitu-
tionality of a wrongful death statute that did not allow illegitimate
children to recover on the death of their mother. In holding the
statute unconstitutional, Justice Douglas, noting that "basic civil
rights" and an "intimate family relationship" were involved,35
32. Professor Gunther's analysis demonstrates how those techniques have been
employed in cases such as Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 86 H~Av. L. REv. at 33-37.
33. Making such an examination involves some difficulties, since in all but one
of the cases-Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972)-the Court did
not use a balancing test. In many cases, however, the Court's discussion clarifies the
approximate weight assigned to the interests involved, even though they did not
explicitly balance them. On the other hand, in a few cases in which a full opinion
was filed, the Court did not discuss some of the important interests at stake.
Additionally, the four cases decided per curiam fail to discuss or even mention some
of the important interests involved. In these instances, this article attempts to
identify the important interests that seem to be involved and make noncontroversial
assumptions about the weight the Court would assign to them.
34. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
35. Id. at 71.
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seemed to invoke an equal protection standard that fell just short
of strict scrutiny. Despite the elliptical nature of Justice Douglas'
opinion, the balancing of the various interests is discernible. One im-
portant individual interest was impaired by the statute: children
were disadvantaged because of the behavior of others-in this case,
their parents' failure to legitimate them.36  In Levy, as in all subse-
quent cases involving illegitimate children, the Court clearly re-
garded such treatment as fundamentally unfair. As Justice Powell
later stated in Weber, "[Immposing disabilities on the illegitimate
child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens
should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrong-
doing.
'37
To counterbalance the impairment of this strong individual in-
terest, the state could assert that the statute served two interests.
First, the state had an interest in discouraging people from having
illegitimate children or, alternatively, in encouraging them to legit-
imate their illegitimate offspring." It was absurd to think that
36. While the Court was emphatic in stating that deprivations based solely on
the status of illegitimacy were unfair, it had difficulty explaining in what way the
Louisiana statute could be viewed as significantly depriving the children. Justice
Douglas argued that they were disadvantaged simply because they were denied
recovery for a wrong that they actually suffered. Stated in this way, the argument
that the children were seriously disadvantaged by the statute was susceptible to an
effective attack made in Justice Harlan's dissent. Justice Harlan stated that wrongful
death statutes would be completely unworkable unless the class of persons who could
recover was limited to a small group of relatives. These relatives might suffer very
little either emotionally or economically on the decedent's death, but it was too
intractable for the state to attempt to determine who had actually loved or depended
on the decedent. Id. at 76-79. Justice Harlan's argument is a cogent criticism
of the children's interest as Justice Douglas stated it, but Justice Douglas easily could
have blunted the criticism by stating the interest differently. The children in
Levy had suffered a wrong for which the wrongful death statute should allow them to
recover, not because of their grief nor because of the death of a person who had in
fact supported them, but because their mother was obligated by statute to support
them. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 240 (West 1952). The purpose for enactment of
wrongful death statutes was to compensate persons who were deprived of support by
the decedent's death. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 904 (4th ed. 1971).
37. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
38. In most states an illegitimate child can be legitimated either through the
marriage of its natural parents or by the formal acknowledgement or recognition of
the child by the father. C. FooTm, R. LEvY & F. SANDERS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
FAMILY LAW 33 (1966). Under Louisiana law a child can be legitimated either
through the marriage of its parents or by declaration of an intent to legitimate by
both parents before a notary. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. arts. 198, 200 (West 1952). How-
ever, only parents who were capable of marrying at the time of conception and have
no legitimate ascendants or descendants can legitimate their illegitimate children. Id.
art. 200. Children who have been legitimated have all the rights of legitimate
children. Short of legitimation, a child can attain the lesser rights of a "natural
child," id. arts. 202, 206, if either or both parents acknowledge it before a notary. Id.
people were discouraged from having illegitimate children because
those children would be unable to recover if their parents were tor-
tiously killed.8 9 The only other interest asserted by the state was
the inconvenience of having to determine whether a claimant
was the illegitimate child of the decedent. Since courts often re-
solve questions of parentage in other contexts, 40 however, this argu-
ment carried little weight. Indeed, the statute may have even
harmed a state interest since it failed to penalize the tortfeasor who
happened to kill an unmarried parent.4'
In summary, Levy balanced the impairment of an important in-
dividual interest (the illegitimate child's interest in recovering for
the wrongful death of his mother) and the impairment of a state in-
terest (penalizing all tortfeasors) against a state interest poorly
served by the statute (discouraging people from having illegitimate
children or encouraging their legitimation) and a weak state interest
(administrative convenience). It is not surprising, therefore, that
the statute was held unconstitutional.
In weighing the three interests, the Court established a pattern
followed by subsequent cases. The illegitimate children's interest
was accorded substantial weight. The weight assigned to the state's
interest in promoting the traditional family was less apparent. Since
the Court concluded that the challenged statute poorly served the
state's interest, however, the outcome of the case did not indicate
that the illegitimate children's interest was weightier. The Court's
discussion of whether the challenged statute served the state's in-
terest in promoting the traditional family indicated the value as-
signed to that interest. Because the illegitimate's interest was sig-
nificant, use of the strict scrutiny test was appropriate. Under this
test the Court considered three requirements: whether the state's
interest was compelling; whether the challenged statute promoted
art. 203. But children conceived by parents who were at that time incapable of
marrying cannot even be acknowledged. Id. art. 204. Unacknowledged illegitimate
children only have the inferior rights of "bastards." Id. art. 202.
39. This argument was before the Court in Levy. See Brief for Executive
Council of the American Presbyterian Church and the American Jewish Congress as
Amici Curiae at 14. Justice Douglas used an analogous argument in Glona, which
was decided the same day. 391 U.S. at 75.
Justice Harlan's dissent offered a plausible counterargument. He maintained
that the disincentive to have illegitimate children and the incentive to legitimate them
resulted not from any single statute, but from a complete statutory scheme under
which "the general class of rights that are dependent upon family relationships shall
be accorded only when the formalities as well as the biology of those relationships are
present." 391 U.S. at 80.
40. Paternity suits are the most obvious examples.
41. This point impressed Justice Douglas, but it has serious flaws. For one
thing, the parent of an illegitimate child may have other relatives who could bring an
action for wrongful death. Also, the tortfeasor who kills a person with no close




this compelling state interest; and whether the statute impaired per-
sonal interests only to the extent necessary to serve the state interest.
In Levy the Louisiana statute failed to satisfy the second requirement
and the Court based its holding on this leg of the strict scrutiny test.
This implies that the state's interest in promoting the traditional fam-
ily was sufficient to counterbalance the illegitimate children's inter-
est.
There is, of course, another explanation. The Court may have
bypassed the first leg of this test to express its holding in the least
controversial terms possible. The Louisiana statute may have vio-
lated both the first and second requirements, but fearing that an
opinion stating that promotion of the traditional family was not a sub-
stantial state interest would be extremely controversial, the Court de-
cided to base its holding on the less controversial second require-
ment. This theory may account for the weighing of the state's inter-
est in Levy, but the Court's repeated use of the same technique in
subsequent cases, as well as frequent dicta concerning the impor-
tance of the state's interest in promoting the traditional family,42
tends to contradict it.
2. Labine v. Vincent.4 3-In 1971 the Court addressed the
constitutionality of Louisiana's scheme of intestate succession giving
legitimate children rights superior to those of illegitimate children
who had been "acknowledged" by their father.4" Like Justice
Douglas' opinion in Levy, Justice Black's majority opinion in Labine
failed to state a clear basis for the Court's holding. Despite
this vagueness, it is possible to determine how the Court weighed
the interests involved.
In Levy the principal individual interest impaired was the
child's interest in not being disadvantaged because of the actions of
its parents. The majority in Labine, however, did not believe that
this interest was actually at stake in that case. The disadvantage
claimed in Labine was that the acknowledged illegitimate child was
not given the same rights in intestacy as a legitimate child. In the
Court's view Louisiana law imposed this disadvantage, not because of
ancient prejudice, but because its intestate succession scheme effectu-
42. E.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173 (1972); Labine v.
Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 536 (1971).
43. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
44. Acknowledgement under Louisiana law is described at note 38 supra.
ated the average intestate father's probable preference for his legiti-
mate children in disposing of his estate. Against this weak claim that
the scheme impaired an individual interest, the Court considered two
state interests. First, there was Louisiana's interest in promoting the
traditional family. Although Justice Black mentioned this interest
prominently in his opinion, it is difficult to understand how the
challenged provision promoted this interest. A father's decision to
acknowledge an illegitimate child or marry the child's mother would
hardly be influenced by it since he could leave property to the child
or disinherit it by executing a will. At most, the law arguably pro-
moted the traditional family by preserving more of the estate for the
widow and the legitimate children. Second, the state had an interest
in establishing a scheme of intestate succession to effectuate the intes-
tate's intent. Since any surmise of the intent of the average intestate
was highly speculative, the state had an interest in remaining free to
choose any scheme that was reasonable. The determination that the
average father preferred his legitimate children to his acknowledged
illegitimate children was no less reasonable than a determination that
he preferred his great-grandchildren to take per stirpes rather than
per capita.
The Court upheld the statute, finding the state's interest to be
a sufficient counterbalance to the individual's interest.45 Labine's
balancing of the relevant interests was wholly consistent with Levy's.
There is nothing to suggest that Labine did not give great weight
to the children's interest in not being disadvantaged because of their
illegitimacy. The Court simply felt that Louisiana had accorded
them an inferior place in its scheme of intestate succession, not be-
cause of their illegitimacy per se, but because of the state's estimate
of the average intestate's intent. Justice Black's opinion in Labine
suggested that the state's interest in promoting the traditional family
is significant, which is consistent with the weight suggested for that
interest by the test applied in Levy.
3. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 4 -In Weber Justice
Powell, writing for the Court, held that a provision of Louisiana's
workmen's compensation law giving dependent, unacknowledged
illegitimate children recovery rights inferior to those of legitimate or
45. Justice Brennan's dissent offered two counterarguments. First, he claimed
that whereas the laws of intestate succession in states with common-law backgrounds
were designed largely to effectuate the intestate's supposed intent, Louisiana law,
influenced by its civil-law origins, was far more interested in distributing the
decedent's property in a fair manner. He, therefore, felt that the challenged provision
represented an "official state policy" of discrimination. 401 U.S. at 554. Second, he
contended that men who are willing to suffer the embarrassment of acknowledging an
illegitimate child probably do not desire to disinherit it. Id. at 556. But Justice
Black's answer to this latter point was telling: if the father actually intended to leave
his property to the child, why did he not leave a will? 401 U.S. at 539.
46. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
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acknowledged illegitimate children violated the equal protection
clause. The test used by Justice Powell explicitly balanced the
fights of the individual against those of the state; consequently the
weights assigned by the Court to the various interests were obvious.
In Justice Powell's view, the defect of the statute was that
the child was penalized economically for the behavior of his par-
ents." Louisiana, on the other hand, asserted that the provision
served two state interests. First, it spared the state the burden of
"locating illegitimate children and determining uncertain claims of
parenthood."4 The Court saw no significant burden in this because
recovery was limited to children dependent on the deceased and the
state already determined questions of parentage in other contexts.
The state also claimed that the provision was justified as a means
of promoting the traditional family. "We do not question the im-
portance of that interest," Justice Powell wrote. "[W]hat we do
question is how the challenged statute will promote it."4 He added
that it cannot be thought "that persons will shun illicit relationships
because the offspring may not one day reap the benefits of work-
men's compensation. '50  The Court thus based its holding, as it had
in Levy, on the second leg of the strict scrutiny test. While conced-
ing that the state interest in promoting the traditional family was suf-
ficiently compelling to counterbalance the illegitimate children's in-
terest, the Court found that the challenged statute did not promote
that interest significantly.
4. Richardson v. Davis5' and Richardson v. Griffin.52 -In
these two cases the Supreme Court affirmed without opinion two dis-
trict court decisions holding unconstitutional a provision of the Social
Security Act5" that disadvantaged certain illegitimate children.
Under the Act an acknowledged illegitimate child who could not
under state law inherit from its father in intestacy was eligible for
Social Security benefits on the father's death. 4 If, however, the
47. Although Justice Powell referred to the child's emotional loss, his opinion
emphasized the child's loss of economic support more so than the opinion in Levy. He
noted that the statute challenged here, like the one in Levy, had been designed to
compensate close relatives for loss of support.
48. 406 U.S. at 174.
49. Id. at 173.
50. Id.
51. 409 U.S. 1069, aff'g mem. 342 F. Supp. 588 (D. Conn. 1972).
52. 409 U.S. 1069, aff'g mem. 346 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Md. 1972).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 403(a) (1970).
54. Id. § 416(h) (3).
total monthly benefits exceeded the maximum family amount that
dependents of the deceased could receive, the illegitimate child's
benefits were reduced first.55 Had the child been legitimate, its
share, as well as the shares of all other dependents, would have
been decreased proportionately.5"
The balance of interests in these cases is obvious. The ille-
gitimate child had a strong interest in not losing badly needed sup-
port because of its parents' actions.5 7 Against this, the government
argued that the provision served its interest in promoting the tradi-
tional family. The government's argument, however, was obviously
weak. It is beyond belief that the provision resulted in fewer ille-
gitimate births than would otherwise have occurred. It also is un-
likely that many unmarried parents were aware of this highly techni-
cal provision or how it would affect their dependents. Even if they
did understand the provision, it is doubtful that many were motivated
to legitimate their illegitimate children because of it. Moreover,
parents in the age group that usually have dependent children are
less likely than older persons to order their affairs with their deaths
in mind. The law did save more of the benefits for the spouse and
the legitimate children, but it was unlikely that the decrease in bene-
fits that might result from eliminating this rule would cause many
traditional families to dissolve.
The other interests suggested by the government in the district
courts were either weak or poorly served by the provision in ques-
tion. It was hard to accept the government's claim that the law was
needed to prevent spurious claims since the children affected had
been acknowledged by the deceased and they were refused benefits
only if other dependents exhausted the maximum family amount.
The government's claimed interest in distributing the limited bene-
fits according to what it judged were the decedent's priorities also
lacked credibility. Decedents' priorities in this situation were largely
irrelevant since the decedents affected by this provision were obli-
gated by law to support their illegitimate children.
Thus, Davis and Griffin can easily be explained on the basis
of the Court's weighting of the relevant interests in Levy and Weber.
Levy and Weber suggested that the illegitimate children's interest
was significant. They also suggested that the state's interest in pro-
moting the traditional family was to be given substantial weight, but
that the challenged provision must significantly promote the state's
interest to be upheld.
55. Id. § 403(a).
56. Id.
57. In these cases, as in Levy and Weber, the assistance at stake was designed
to compensate partially for the loss of support to which the child had been legally
entitled. Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1226, 1235 (D. Md. 1972).
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5. Gomez v. Perez.5 8-In a brief, per curiam decision the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a Texas ,precedent requiring
fathers to support their legitimate children but not their illegitimate
ones. The Court offered little explanation for its holding. Citing
Levy and Weber, it simply stated that "a State may not invidiously
discriminate against illegitimate children by denying them substantial
benefits accorded children generally." 59  Despite the paucity of ex-
planation in Gomez, it is possible to make an educated guess con-
cerning the balance of interests struck by the Court.
As in the previous cases involving illegitimate children, the
Court probably felt that the chief individual interest was the depriva-
tion of badly needed support for the child solely because of the par-
ents' behavior. The per curiam opinion labeled this deprivation
"illogical and unjust. ' 60 To counterbalance this interest, the state
asserted its interest in discouraging people from having illegitimate
children or encouraging their legitimation. The Court might have
questioned whether this statute served either of those goals. It is
doubtful whether most people who have illegitimate children are
aware of the law of support or are influenced by it. Even if they
are, however, the law in question would tend to encourage fathers to
have illegitimate children, while discouraging mothers from doing so.
Imposition of a support duty on fathers would simply reverse the in-
centives. Which rule would result in fewer illegitimate births is
problematic. It also seems doubtful that the Texas rule encouraged
legitimation of illegitimates; in fact, it probably had the opposite ef-
fect. Under the rule fathers may have been discouraged from legiti-
mating children because doing so would mean imposition of a
support duty. If they were required to support the child whether
or not legitimated, the incentive to forego legitimation, either by
marriage or acknowledgment, would be removed.
In short, Gomez is best explained on the same basis as Levy,
Weber, Davis, and Griffin. Since the individual interest impaired
was given great weight, an equal protection test approaching strict
scrutiny was triggered. The first leg of that test was satisfied because
the asserted state interest-promotion of the traditional family-was
substantial. The law failed the second leg of the test, however, be-
cause it did not significantly promote that interest.
58. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
59. Id. at 538.
60. Id. The mother's interest in not bearing an extra burden of support solely
because she had not married was also involved here, although it was not mentioned by
the Court.
B. Classifications Excluding Biological or Associational Families
and Their Members
1. Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co.61
-This case, the first involving an equal protection challenge
to a classification excluding biological and associational families, was
the companion case of Levy. The Court held that the Louisiana
wrongful death statute, which was held unconstitutional in part in
Levy, was also unconstitutional insofar as it barred a mother from
recovering for the death of her illegitimate child. The only individ-
ual interest asserted was the mother's interest in recovering for a
wrong suffered by her.62 The state asserted an interest in discourag-
ing people from having illegitimate children or encouraging their le-
gitimation. As in Levy, however, the Court did not think this inter-
est was significantly advanced by the statute. Justice Douglas ob-
served, "It would, indeed, be farfetched to assume that women
have illegitimate children so that they can be compensated in dam-
ages for their death."63  In addition, Justice Douglas felt that the
state's interest in administrative convenience was no stronger in this
case than it had been in Levy64 and that the statute frustrated the
state's interest in penalizing tortfeasors. 65
Although Glona did not reveal the weights that the Court would
assign to the interests involved, it did provide some clear implica-
tions. The mother's interest in not being disadvantaged because she
was unmarried or because she belonged to a biological family was
not even mentioned. If the only individual interest impaired by the
act was the mother's financial interest, on the other hand, an equal
protection test approximating minimal scrutiny would have been ap-
propriate. Moreover, while the state interests promoted by this act
may not have been very substantial, they probably were sufficient
to satisfy minimal scrutiny. The ease with which Justice Douglas
found that these state interests were overcome suggests, however,
that a much higher degree of scrutiny was employed. If that is true,
61. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
62. See Brief for Petitioner at 17. The mother's interest in choosing a
biological rather than a traditional family might well have been claimed, and it might
have been had the case been litigated a few years later.
As in Levy, to parry Justice Harlan's attack, the mother's interest must
be rephrased in terms of a legal right to support. But that causes no problem since
Louisiana law requires illegitimate children to support their parents, and historically,
wrongful death statutes allowed parents to recover for the death of their children
primarily as compensation for the loss of the children's economic support.
63. 391 U.S. at 75. Justice Douglas' discussion of Louisiana's 'curious course
in its sanctions against illegitimacy" may mean that he believed that Louisiana was
not convinced that penalizing illegitimates was an efficacious or fair way to deter
immorality. He noted that many Louisiana statutes, unlike its wrongful death statute,
extended rights or benefits to legitimate and illegitimate children.
64. Id. at 76.
65. Id. at 75.
Family Membership Classifications
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
the law must have impaired an important individual interest. There-
fore, the logical conclusion is that the mother's interest in not being
disadvantaged because of her family membership weighed heavily in
the Court's decision, albeit implicitly. While the Court regarded as
important the state's interest in promoting the traditional family, it
failed to discern how the statute promoted the interest; hence the
statute did not satisfy the second leg of the strict scrutiny test."6
66. Some commentators have viewed Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972),
as having far-reaching implications concerning the constitutionality of laws discrimi-
nating against unmarried parents. Actually, it revealed little with regard to the
weights that the Court attributed to the interests promoted and impaired by such
statutes.
Stanley involved an Illinois law under which a child, one or both of whose
parents were living, could be declared a ward of the state only after a hearing at
which the unfitness of the parent or parents was shown. The law included the
mother of an illegitimate child within its definition of a parent, but excluded the
illegitimate child's father. The state was able to make an illegitimate child whose
mother had died a ward of the state without giving notice to the child's father and
without proving the father's unfitness. The Court held that this scheme violated the
equal protection clause. Almost all of Justice White's opinion for the Court,
however, was devoted to showing that, under the due process clause, "all Illinois
parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their children
are removed from their custody." Id. at 658. Having done this, Justice White
merely added with regard to the equal protection clause, "It follows that denying such
a hearing to Stanley and those like him while granting it to other Illinois parents is
inescapably contrary to the Equal Protection Clause." Id. In addressing the due
process issue, Justice White recognized that determination of due process rights
always requires consideration of "the precise nature of the government function
involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental
action." Id. at 650. Ironically, because Stanley was decided primarily under this due
process standard, which explicitly balances interests, it is much easier to determine
how the Court decided the equal protection issue in Stanley than in some of the cases
decided solely under the equal protection clause.
Justice White argued that one strong individual interest was impaired by the
challenged law: fathers of illegitimate children were deprived of the custody of their
children without a hearing and a showing of unfitness. The state contended that this
interest was not very substantial since the father might later regain custody of the
children as a guardian or through adoption, but Justice White rejected this argument.
He noted that even if the father did regain custody, he still would have suffered from
the interim deprivation of custody. In addition, a poor, unmarried father who had
already been "presumed unfit" by statute might have a difficult time adopting the
child or regaining custody and control. As the Court read the Illinois law, it
certainly did not give him priority. In sum, the Court felt that this interest of the
unmarried father "undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervail-
ing interest, protection." Id. at 651.
Justice White quickly disposed of the state's asserted interest in protecting the
total welfare of the child. Justice White conceded this was an important state
interest, but he did not see that it was advanced by denying the illegitimate father
notice and a hearing. In fact, he felt the Illinois scheme would frustrate this
important state interest in those instances in which the unmarried father was a loving
and fit parent. The only real state interest promoted by the statute, Justice White
thought, was the administrative convenience of dispensing with hearings on the fitness
of unmarried fathers since it could be presumed that most of them were unfit. Justice
White answered that while "[p]rocedure by presumption is always cheaper and
2. New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill.6 -
This 1973 case appeared to hold that biological families with
children must be treated in all significant respects the same as
traditional families with children. The case concerned the consti-
tutionality of New Jersey's Assistance to Families of the Working
Poor (AFWP) program,6" which granted benefits only to families
in which the parents were ceremonially married. 69 Unlike the stat-
utes challenged in Levy, Labine, Weber, and Gomez, this statute
granted benefits to families rather than children. 70  A three-judge
court in New Jersey had upheld the plan as an "attempt to preserve
and strengthen traditional family life."'71  Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court found that the plan "in practical effect" discriminated against
illegitimate children. 72  Citing Levy, Weber, and Gomez, it quickly
held the challenged provision unconstitutional. 71
The per curiam opinion in Cahill made it seem that the Court
had broken new ground. It suggested that even though this
statute appeared to advance significantly the state's interest in pro-
moting the traditional family, the interests of the biological family
and its members were weighty enough to overcome this state inter-
est. Although the opinion noted the state's claim that the statute pro-
moted the traditional family, unlike previous cases involving illegit-
imate children, it did not attempt to disprove this claim.
Nevertheless, an analysis of the interests involved in this case
suggests that no new ground was broken. Two individual in-
terests clearly were at stake in Cahill: the illegitimate children's
interest in not being disadvantaged because of their parents' actions
and the parents' interest in not being disadvantaged because they
easier than individualized determination," id. at 656-57, that did not justify "running
roughshod over the important interest of both parent and child." Id. at 657.
With regard to the weights attributable to the three interests that are prominent
in family membership cases, Stanley is not very informative. The father's interest in
not being seriously disadvantaged because he was unmarried or because he belonged
to a biological family was impaired and may have been given significant weight by
the Court. This would be consistent with the implications in Glona. The determina-
tive individual interest, however, might just as easily have been Mr. Stanley's interest
in not suffering discrimination because he was the children's father rather than their
mother. Alternatively, the important individual interest might have been the chil-
dren's interest in not being removed from their established home without a hearing.
Stanley also failed to elucidate the weight attributable to the state's interest in
promoting the traditional family. Illinois did not even contend that the challenged
measure could be justified as a means of serving this interest, and the Court did not
consider this argument.
67. 411 U.S. 619 (1973).
68. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:13-1 to -13 (Supp. 1975).
69. Id. § 44:13-3(a).
70. Id. § 44:13-1.
71. New Jersey Welfare Rts. Org. v. Cahill, 349 F. Supp. 491, 496 (D.N.J.
1972).
72. 411 U.S. at 619-20.
73. Id. at 620-21.
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formed a biological rather than a traditional family. Against these,
the state asserted an interest in discouraging people from having ille-
gitimate children and encouraging people who have them to marry.
If the program was considered by itself, it plausibly created a power-
ful incentive to marry. On the other hand, an obvious point raised in
the district court opinion 74 suggests that the plan's eligibility require-
ment might have had a different effect. A biological family denied
aid under the AFWP program could receive a larger amount of as-
sistance if the children could qualify for the federal Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, which gave assistance
to dependent children only if one of the parents was absent from the
home. Nearly every discussion of welfare reform in the late 1960's
pointed out that AFDC encouraged the fathers of low-income fami-
lies to leave home and make their children eligible for the
program.75 In fact, the predecessor76 of New Jersey's AFWP pro-
gram was designed to remedy this situation by extending AFDC to
some poor families in which both parents lived in the home.77 This
plan, which had not excluded illegitimate children, was replaced by
AFWP in 1971. In short, it appeared that AFWP might encourage
fathers of illegitimate children to leave home rather than marry and
that consequence would not serve the state's interest in promoting
family life.
Viewed in this way, Cahill fits neatly into the pattern of the
previous family membership cases. The individual interest impaired
-the interest of families made ineligible in not being disad-
vantaged because they were biological rather than traditional-
was a substantial one and, therefore, triggered an equal protection
test that approached strict scrutiny. The first leg of this test was
satisfied since the state interest assertedly promoted by the measure
was also weighty. The law was unconstitutional, however, because it
failed the second leg of the test in that the statute served the state
interest poorly.
74. 349 F. Supp. at 497.
75. See, e.g., D. MoyNiHA, THE POLITICS OF A GUARANTEED INCOME 91-92
(1973).
76. Ch. 138, N.J. Laws of 1968 (repealed 1971).
77. See Statement of Governor Richard J. Hughes on signing S-754, S-755 and
A-799, July 10, 1968: "The prior law rewarded and indeed encouraged the dissolution
of the family by denying assistance to unbroken homes. The so-called 'man in the
house' rule served to defeat a primary objective of the Social Security Act and our
own aid program."
3. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno.7r-As originally en-
acted, the federal Food Stamp Act of 1964 aided needy "house-
holds," including groups of related or unrelated individuals and
single individuals living alone. 79 In 1971 Congress, apparently
motivated in part by a desire to exclude "hippie communes,"" ° re-
stricted eligibility to groups of related individuals and persons living
alone."'
In Department of Agriculture v. Moreno the constitutionality
of this amendment was challenged in a class action. The named
plaintiffs appear to have been carefully chosen to emphasize the
amendment's impact on persons who were not members of the coun-
terculture: they included a mother of three who had charitably
taken in an adolescent girl with emotional problems; a middle-aged
diabetic woman on welfare who shared a home with another woman
and her three children in order to economize; and a mother on wel-
fare with a deaf child who shared an apartment with another woman
in a middle-class neighborhood to be near an institution for
the deaf.8 2 Writing for a three-judge court, Judge McGowan stated
that the only purpose that might justify the amendment was the "fos-
tering of morality. 8a3 He felt, however, that the Supreme Court's de-
cisions in Griswold v. Connecticut,"4 Stanley v. Georgia,8 and Eisen-
stadt v. Baird"6 made it clear that Congress could not "in the name of
morality infringe the rights of privacy and freedom of association in
the home."' 7  He, therefore, held the amendment unconstitutional.
When Moreno was argued in the Supreme Court, the govern-
ment dropped the argument that the provision's purpose was to fos-
ter morality-probably to deemphasize the statute's impact on
intimate personal relationships so that it could be argued that only
the minimal scrutiny test should be applied to this legislation. Dand-
ridge v. Williams,a8 in particular, may have suggested this course of
action to the government since, in that case, the Court applied the
minimal scrutiny test to a welfare statute that impinged on individual
interests similar to those involved in Moreno. 9 At any rate, aban-
78. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
79. Act of Aug. 31, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525, § 3(e), 78 Stat. 703 (codified
at 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (1964)) (amended 1971).
80. 413 U.S. at 534.
81. Act of Jan. 11, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-671, § 2(a), 84 Stat. 2048, amending
7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (1970).
82. Moreno v. Department of Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 312 n.4 (D.D.C. 1972),
af'd, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
83. Id. at 314.
84. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
85. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
86. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
87. 345 F. Supp. at 314.
88. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
89. The government argued repeatedly in its brief that only minimal scrutiny
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doning the purpose of fostering morality, the government argued in-
stead that the amendment's purpose was to combat fraud. The
amendment achieved this goal, the government contended, since
households containing unrelated individuals were more likely to con-
tain individuals who failed to report income or who voluntarily re-
mained poor. In addition, the instability of such households made
the detection of fraud more difficult.
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan held the amendment un-
constitutional in an opinion employing the legerdemain traditionally
used by the Court to find violations of the minimal scrutiny stand-
ard. He found that the amendment clearly was not rationally related
to the stated purposes of the Food Stamp Act as originally enacted,
viz., strengthening the agricultural sector and improving nutrition.
If the purpose of the statute was "to harm a politically unpopular
group" such as hippies, that purpose was not legitimate." Alterna-
tively, if the purpose was, as the government claimed, to prevent
fraud, a rational relationship still was not established since other pro-
visions of the Act were specifically designed to combat fraud and the
amendment's alleged impact was unsubstantiated. Justice Brennan
did not discuss the purpose of fostering morality, other than to men-
tion approvingly in a footnote that the court below had found that
purpose impermissible. 91
The major difficulty in determining how the Court balanced the
interests in Moreno is deciding whether to count the government's
interest in fostering morality or, as it might have been phrased, en-
couraging the formation of traditional rather than biological or asso-
ciational families. If that interest is not counted, the outcome of the
case is easily explicable. Without that weight on the government's
side of the scale, the individual's interest in not losing badly needed
aid because the persons with whom he chose to live were unrelated
easily outweighed the state's interest in combating fraud, an
interest that was more effectively protected by other provisions of
the statute.
There is, however, a credible argument for counting the state's
interest in promoting the traditional family. As noted earlier, hold-
ing a statute unconstitutional under minimal scrutiny always requires
should be used since "[a]ny effect on associational rights is merely inicidental to the
welfare purpose of the statute." Brief for Appellant at 9.
90. 413 U.S. at 534.
91. Id. at 535 n.7.
that a purpose to which the challenged law is rationally related be
ignored.92 If the state's interest in promoting the traditional family is
counted, the holding becomes more significant because it suggests
that the interests of associational and biological families outweighed
the state's interest in promoting the traditional family. Furthermore,
this conclusion cannot be escaped by arguing, as the Court had in
many previous cases, that the statute did not promote the state in-
terest because in this case it plainly appeared to do so.
Both the majority opinion and Justice Douglas' concurring
opinion suggest, however, that another consideration was involved in
the balance and tipped the scale in favor of unconstitutionality. The
fact that the households in which named plaintiffs lived did not vio-
late traditional morality was one hint.93  Another was that Justice
Brennan noted the lower court's statement that the provision was not
rationally related "to prevailing notions of morality, since it . . .
disqualifies all households of unrelated individuals, without reference
to whether a particular group contains both sexes."' 94 In addition, he
quoted9" from a letter written by California's Director of Social Wel-
fare that, in a paragraph not quoted by the Court, stated that many
housing facilities in migrant labor camps in the state were so con-
structed that the amendment would disqualify their residents. 96
Justice Douglas also described named plaintiffs at length.
Furthermore, in stating the issue in question, he appeared to believe
that their characteristics were representative of the class the
amendment had excluded. The individual right at stake, he wrote,
was the "right of association, the right to invite the stranger into
one's home. 97  Moreover, the law was not "directed to the
maintenance of the family as a unit but treats impoverished
households composed of relatives more favorably than impoverished
households having a single unrelated person."'  He also observed
that the amendment did not make common-law couples or persons
living alone ineligible.99
The Court simply may have been attempting to make the least
controversial decision. The opinions suggest, however, that the Court
believed that the amendment, far from aiding traditional families, de-
prived many of them of sustenance because charity or economic nec-
92. See notes 20-24 and accompanying text supra.
93. 413 U.S. at 531-32.
94. Id. at 535 n.7, quoting 345 F. Supp. at 315.
95. 413 U.S. at 537-38.
96. Letter from Robert B. Carleson, Calif. Dir. of Soc. Welfare, to Kenneth
Schlossberg, Staff Dir., U.S. Senate Select Comm. on Nutrition and Human Needs,
Nov. 15, 1971, Appendix to Record at 43.
97. 413 U.S. at 543 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 544 (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 542.
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essity impelled them to live with one or more unrelated individuals.
The plight of these families may have been the decisive element in
the case.
If this interpretation of Moreno is correct, the case fits into the
pattern of earlier family membership cases. As in Cahill, an equal
protection test approaching strict scrutiny was triggered by the
impairment of a substantial personal interest, viz., the individual's in-
terest in not being disadvantaged by the family arrangement in which
he chooses to live. The state's interest in promoting the traditional
family was weighty enough to satisfy the first leg of this test and the
second leg was satisfied by the statute's effectiveness in serving this
state interest. The law was held unconstitutional, nevertheless, be-
cause it did not pass the third leg of the test: it impaired important
individual interests beyond the extent necessary to serve the state's
interest since it disqualified families that did not violate traditional
morality, as well as biological and associational families.
4. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas.100-This case involved
the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance permitting only single-
family dwellings and defining a family as any number of related per-
sons who lived and cooked together or no more than two unrelated
persons who lived and cooked together. Although the second part
of the ordinance's definition was not well designed for promoting the
traditional family, when the ordinance was challenged in the District
Court for the Eastern District of New York, it was upheld on that
ground. The ordinance was found to be
simply another of countless statutes of bounty and protection
with which the states, and all of them, and the Federal govern-
ment alike aggressively surround the traditional family of parents
and their children, reaching from family court laws, through laws
of inheritance to tax laws. 101
The Second Circuit, on the other hand, held that the ordi-
nance violated the equal protection clause. Writing for the court,
Judge Mansfield expressed uncertainty about which equal protection
test would be applicable if he were forced to choose, as the two-
tiered, "new" equal protection required, between minimal and strict
scrutiny. The appellants, three college students and their landlords,
argued that their fundamental rights to freedom of association and
100. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
101. Quoted in Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 810 (2d Cir.
1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
privacy were infringed, but the court was not wholly convinced.
Judge Mansfield concluded, however, that the choice between min-
imal and strict scrutiny was unnecessary because the "newer"
equal protection could be used. Applying that standard, he refused
to find the ordinance rationally related to various land use objectives
-controlling population density, excessive traffic, and noise and
preventing transiency-since the record did not contain evidence
proving that it actually achieved those goals. With regard to the dis-
trict court holding, Judge Mansfield stated that "the protection and
maintenance of the prevailing traditional family pattern, which con-
sists of occupancy of one-family houses by families based on con-
sanguinity or legal affinity," did not "fall within the proper exercise
of state police power."
10 2
The case reached an anticlimax in the Supreme Court. Justice
Douglas' majority opinion was not entirely clear. He recounted the
Court's prior zoning cases and the zoning objectives that had been
found legitimate and concluded with the following statement:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor
vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land use project
addressed to family needs.... [The police power] is ample to
lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the bless-
ings of quiet seclusion, and clean air make the area a sanctuary
for people.10 3
The grounds on which the ordinance had been challenged were re-
garded as astonishingly insubstantial. The Court stated flatly that
no fundamental rights, such as privacy or freedom of association,
were impinged. It said nothing more about privacy and about free-
dom of association the opinion merely noted that the ordinance per-
mitted a family to entertain whomever it liked.'04 Observing that
"[i]t is said that the Belle Terre ordinance reeks with animosity to
unmarried couples who live together," Justice Douglas commented
that Moreno "is therefore inapt as there a household containing any-
one unrelated to the rest was denied food stamps.' ' 5 This statement
supports the interpretation that the fatal element in Moreno was the
amendment's impact on traditional families.
It is unclear what weights were assigned by the Court to the
various interests involved in Boraas. The only explanation for
Boraas may be that the Court applied the minimal scrutiny test in
its classic, permissive form. An all but insuperable weight repre-
102. Id. at 815.
103. 416 U.S. at 9.
104. Id.




senting deference to legislative judgment in the sphere of zoning was
placed on the government's side of the scale.1"6 If this interpreta-
tion is correct, Boraas reveals little about the weight that the Court
attributed to the three interests with which this article is concerned.
IV. Conclusion
The cases involving classifications based on family membership,
while superficially confused and contradictory, can be reconciled if
it is hypothesized that the Court heavily weighted the interest of chil-
dren in not being disadvantaged by their illegitimacy, the interest
of individuals in freely choosing their family structure, and the state's
interest in promoting the traditional family. Both the outcomes in
these cases and the Court's opinions are consistent with these
hypotheses.
The Court, of course, cannot be regarded as irretrievably com-
mitted to this valuation of the relevant interests. On the other hand,
the Court's use of this approach in several cases indicates that it pro-
duces moderate results acceptable to most of the members of the
Court.
An approach that highly values both the individual's interest in
freely choosing his family structure and the state's interest in promot-
ing the traditional family may seem quite odd. Nevertheless, this ap-
proach represents a sensible way of viewing the problem. While the
Court was willing to tolerate some impairments of the individual's
interests to promote the traditional family, it would not permit un-
necessary infringements.
In any event, if the Court is committed to valuing both interests
highly, it would certainly be preferable to do so explicitly. It
could then apply the same equal protection test-essentially the
second and third legs of the strict scrutiny test-in all cases in
this area. This approach would avoid the impression of inconsist-
ency created in the previous cases and would clarify the constitu-
tional status of many important laws that make classifications based
on family membership.
106. While there are a number of situations in which the Court would not defer
to the judgment of the state or municipality on zoning questions, the Court gave no
hint what they might be.
